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Abstract
Many countries organize their higher education system with limited or no ex ante
admission standards. They instead rely more heavily on an ex post selection mecha-
nism, based on the studentsperformance during higher education. We analyze how
a system with ex post selection a¤ects initial enrollment and nal degree completion,
using a rich dataset for Belgium (region of Flanders). We develop a dynamic discrete
choice model of college/university and major choice, where the outcome of the enroll-
ment decision is uncertain. Upon observing past performance, students may decide to
continue, reorient to another major, or drop out. We nd that ex post student selection
is very strong: less than half of the students successfully complete their course work in
the rst year. Unsuccessful students mainly switch from university to college majors,
or from college majors to drop-out. We use the estimates of our model to evaluate the
e¤ects of alternative, ex ante admission policies. We nd that a suitably designed ex
ante screening system (with moderate admission thresholds) can considerably increase
degree completion in higher education. A discriminatory screening system for univer-
sities only, can raise total degree completion even more, though it implies a shift from
university to college degrees.
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1 Introduction
The organization of higher education often involves di¢ cult tradeo¤s between the objectives
of enrollment and degree completion within a reasonable time. On the one hand, govern-
ments aim to ensure broad access to a large number of students. On the other hand, they
want to allocate resources e¢ ciently and minimize drop-out or delay by matching students
to educational programs according to their skills. A recent policy report (OECD, 2012)
illustrates the problems in the organization of higher education: up to 62% of todays young
adults in OECD countries enter a university-level program, but only 39% are expected to
complete it. Among the students who complete a degree, there is a large fraction that incurs
substantial delays.
Several countries have used ex ante screening or admission policies to inuence the pos-
sible trade-o¤s between enrollment, completion and e¢ ciency. In the U.S., students are
mainly screened ex ante, through admission standards and tuition fees. But admission stan-
dards mainly apply to universities and not to the community colleges. In Europe, some
countries have also adopted ex ante admission policies, most notably in the U.K. and Ire-
land. But most other European countries largely select students on an ex post basis: both
admission standards and tuition fees are very low, and students are selected based on their
performance during their higher education. Belgium, the focus of our empirical analysis, is a
prominent example of such an ex post selection system. On the one hand, tuition fees are low
and all high school graduates are entitled to start at almost all higher education programs,
regardless of their specic high school degree. On the other hand, there is very strong ex
post selection especially after the rst year of higher education, where many students drop
out or switch from university to college majors.
In this paper, we study such a system of ex post student selection to analyze the possible
trade-o¤s between enrollment, completion and e¢ ciency. We develop and estimate a dynamic
discrete choice model of college and major choice, where the outcome of the enrollment
decision is uncertain. Upon observing past performance, students may decide to continue,
reorient to another institution and/or major, or drop out, thereby balancing their current
costs and benets from studying against the future expected benets on the labor market.
We account for the impact of demographics and high school background on choices and study
success. We also control for unobserved factors a¤ecting utility and success, and we allow
for correlation of these unobserved factors over time by assuming that students are drawn
from a nite mixture distribution.1
1To estimate the model, we use the conditional choice probability (CCP) technique developed by Hotz
and Miller (1993) and further rened by Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) to allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
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We apply our analysis using rich register data for Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of
Belgium, where there is essentially no ex ante screening and very strong ex post selection
(similar to the French-speaking part of Belgium and many other countries). This unique
setting of ex post selection allows us to observe the prefered option of students since choices
are hardly constrained. All high school graduates can choose almost any program at two
types of institutions: colleges (professional orientation) and universities (academic orien-
tation). Success rates after the rst year are low (less than 50% after the rst year), but
highly predictable by student characteristics (such as high school track record). Unsuccessful
university students tend to either persist or reorient towards college majors. Unsuccessful
college students also tend to either persist or reorient to other college majors, or they drop
out from higher education altogether. As a result, less than 40% of the students complete
their rst three years without delay and many students need up to six years. This implies
large losses from mismatching in the form of reorientation or drop-out.
We use the parameter estimates to evaluate the e¤ects of introducing ex ante admission
policies. More precisely, we consider the e¤ects of restricting access to study options for
students with low predicted rst-year success rates. For example, this implies restricting
access to sciences majors for students without a su¢ cient math background in high school,
since the model predicts very low success rates for these cases. We consider the e¤ects of
such admission policies on both overall educational attainment (the number of students that
eventually graduate) and on the relative number of students that graduate without delay.
We nd that an ex ante screening system with modest admission thresholds can increase
overall educational attainment in higher education.
First, we consider a uniform admission standard that applies to both colleges and uni-
versities. A modest admission threshold to students with a predicted success rate in study
options of at least 28% maximizes overall educational attainment: it reduces the rst-year
entry rate by 5.5% points, and at the same time it increases overall educational attainment
by 1.4% points (+1.7% points at colleges and a negligible 0.3% points at universities). This
is because the admission threshold induces a shift from universities to colleges in the rst
year: students with very low expected success rates will now immediately choose other pro-
grams at colleges where they expect higher success rates. In sum, a mild uniform admission
standard turns out not to involve any tradeo¤s: the number of rst-year entrants decreases,
but success rates and overall educational attainment increase.
Second, we consider a discriminatory admission standard which only applies to universi-
ties and not to colleges with a more professional orientation. This policy would be somewhat
closer to the current U.S. system with stronger admission restrictions at universities than at
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the community colleges2. An admission threshold to students with a predicted success rate
of at least 42% at university majors turns out to maximize overall educational attainment: it
reduces the rst-year entry rate by 1.9% points, and raises educational attainment by 2.3%
points. However, this increase in educational attainment involves a large shift from univer-
sities to colleges: there is a large increase in college diplomas (+3.7% points), which comes
at the expense of university diplomas (1.4% points). In sum, a discriminatory admission
standard can also improve e¢ ciency without reducing overall attainment, but it involves
trading o¤ university versus college attainment.
Ex ante screening systems of higher education have already been studied extensively in the
literature, mainly based on the U.S. system. Important contributions analyzing the choice
process under admission policies are for example Arcidiacono (2005), Epple et al. (2006) and
Fu (2014). In contrast, there has been only very limited research on the ex post selection
systems in various European countries. Closest to our research is a small literature on how
nancial incentives can inuence study duration or time to complete a degree. Garibaldi,
Giavazzi, Ichino and Rettore (2012) show how a 1,000e increase in continuation tuition at
Bocconi university (Milan) reduces the probability of late graduation by 5.2% points, without
inducing more drop-outs. Gunnes, Kirkeboen and Ronning (2013) show that a restitution
of 3,000$ in Norway to students who complete their program on time reduced study delay
by between 0.8 and 1.5 semesters.3 In contrast with these papers, we directly focus on the
question how a (partial) shift from ex post selection to ex ante screening can reduce study
duration without inducing drop-out.
Another related literature has analyzed rst-year participation and study decisions. Sta-
tic discrete choice models consider the decision of major and institution, and analyze the
e¤ect of travel costs and tuition fees on enrollment; see Long (2004), Frenette (2006) and
Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010). Dynamic discrete choice models study how students
trade o¤ the short-term costs and benets of studying with the long-term e¤ects, accounting
for drop-out and increased future earnings; see Keane and Wolpin (1997), Arcidiacono (2004
and 2005) and Joensen (2009). We combine these literatures and specically account for
uncertainty in the outcome of enrollment under ex post student selection. We also consider
much richer choice sets than in current dynamic discrete choice models and incorporate
unobserved heterogeneity in both educational choices and study outcomes.
2Long and Kurlaender (2009) analyze enrollment at community colleges that o¤er open and a¤ordable
access to tertiary education.
3Other studies on nancial incentives and time to complete a degree include Hakkinen and Uusitalo (2003)
on a nancial aid reform in Finland; Heineck, Kifman and Lorenz (2006) on extra tuition fees for delayed
students in Germany; and Dynarski (2003) on merit aid programs in Georgia and Arkansas.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews admission policies
in higher education across di¤erent OECD countries. Section 3 provides an institutional
overview of the higher education system in Flanders, and takes a rst look at the rich
register data, describing rst-year participation, subsequent success and reorientation after
the rst year. Section 4 then sets up a dynamic discrete choice model, accounting for the
key institutional features of the ex post selection system. Finally, section 5 discusses the
empirical results and section 6 uses the parameter estimates to analyze the impact of some
alternative ex ante admission policies on rst-year attendance, study e¢ ciency and overall
educational attainment.
2 Admission policies in higher education
Admission policies aim to improve the matching between students and programs. Students
base their matching decisions on their preferences, previous background and intrinsic skills.
But students may make the wrong matching decisions for a variety of reasons, for example
because they do not account for the full educational costs of studying (as is the case when
education is subsidized), or because they overestimate or underestimate their talents. Stine-
brickner and Stinebrickner (2013) show that students on average overestimate their talents
at entrance and that 45% of the drop-out that occurs in the rst two years of college can be
attributed to what students learn about their academic performance. Admission policies can
thus help to improve the matching process, which can reduce drop-out rates, increase the
number of graduating students, and increase the speed at which they graduate. Admission
policies also have their limitations. For example, they may not be based on su¢ ciently accu-
rate information about students, or they may be too strict, thereby preventing potentially
good matches.
Helms (2011) compares the admission policies in higher education across various coun-
tries. He considers the role of examinations, secondary school preparation, application ma-
terials and demographic factors. Countries have followed diverse policies concerning the
screening and selection of students. Some countries have strict ex ante screening policies,
while other countries have weak or no ex ante screening and only have ex post selection.
Countries also di¤er in the level of tuition fees. We can accordingly classify countries in
three groups.
The rst group of countries mainly selects students ex ante, through both screening
policies and tuition fees. An example of this group is the U.S., where institutions set their
own admission standards within boundaries set by the states (Cheps, 2011). As a result,
not all states have universally adopted admission standards. For example, in Texas and
5
California, community colleges accept all students qualifying for higher education, while
universities set their own admission standards. High school grades and test scores are used
as admission criteria and access is guaranteed for the best high school students.4 Some
European countries have also adopted ex ante admission policies. The U.K. has a policy that
is closest to the U.S.: universities are free to set their own admission standards and can set
relatively high tuition fees subject to a cap.5 In Ireland, universities set their own admission
standards based on high school performance (Li, 2012). Tuition fees vary considerably from
around e9,000 up to around e40,000 depending on the program.
A second group of countries has low tuition fees, but still screens students ex ante through
admission standards, such as national entry exams or admission criteria set by the univer-
sities. For example, in Germany, universities use the nal grade in high school as a main
admission criterion (Kübler, 2011).6 Students have to pass a national entry exam for pro-
grams in medicine, education and law. In Sweden, universities determine their competence
requirements for entry based on high school grades and the results of the Swedish Scholastic
Aptitude Test (Cheps, 2011). In Finland (Cheps, 2011) universities select students through
entry examinations, and governments restrict entry through a numerus clausus in all pro-
grams. In Denmark (Cheps, 2011), admissions are based on grades in high school. The
Danish government also determines the maximum number of students in specic elds of
study. In Portugal, the government determines a numerus clausus for each program and stu-
dents are placed according to their preferences and relative marks in the national entrance
exam (Cheps, 2008).
Finally, a third group of countries has low tuition fees and no or weak ex ante screening
policies, i.e. students with an appropriate high school degree are allowed to start at most
higher education programs. In these countries, students are instead selected on an ex post
basis, depending on their performance in courses. For example, in Italy, France, Switzerland
and Austria, all high school graduates who passed a national exam are eligible to start at
most programs at public universities.7 In the Netherlands, students with an appropriate
4In Texas, high school students in the top 10% of their graduating classes are given automatic admission to
public universities (Boland and Mulrennan, 2011). The university of California system guarantees eligibility
for the top 9% state-wide and the top 9% at each school (Cheps, 2011).
5As discussed in Cheps (2011), students have to send an application form that contains high school results,
a personal statement and a reference from the applicants school to each institution for which they want to
apply. Institutions also set their own tuition fees, but subject to a cap, currently at £ 9000 (Li, 2012).
6For programs with capacity constraints in German universities, the governement has determined that
20% of study places should be allocated to the best performing high school graduates (Cheps, 2011).
7In Italy, students only have to pass an entry exam for programs for which the Italian law imposes a
maximum number of students (Merlino and Nicolo, 2012). Private institutions can set their own admission
standards. In Switzerland, all study programs that do not have capacity restrictions are open to students
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high school degree are allowed to start at all programs where no restrictions on the number
of students apply. For programs with a quota, students have to participate in a nationally
organized, weighted lottery system.8
Table 1 provides an overview of admission policies in OECD countries. We classify
the countries in the above three groups according to the main type of screening policy
(although specic admission criteria can di¤er across institutions, programs or regions within
the country). For each country, Table 1 shows the rst-year enrollment rates (or entry
rates), the completion rates and a measure of e¢ ciency.9 Enrollment rates are dened as
the percentage of an age cohort that is expected to enter a university level program (tertiary
type A).10 Completion rates are similarly dened as the percentage of an age cohort that
is expected to graduate from a university level program over the lifetime. We calculate
e¢ ciency as the ratio of both: the percentage of university-level graduates divided by the
percentage of university-level entrants.
Table 1 suggests some interesting preliminary observations. First-year enrollment or
entry rates are not necessarily lower in countries with ex ante screening policies (the rst
and second group). For example, Sweden and the U.S. have the highest entry rates despite
ex ante screening policies (and in addition tuition fees in the U.S.). Second, graduation
rates also tend to be somewhat higher in countries with ex ante screening, with the highest
graduation rates in the U.K., Denmark and Ireland. Third, the e¢ ciency (ratio of graduation
over entry rates) also tends to be higher in countries with ex ante screening policies, with the
highest e¢ ciency ratios in Ireland, the U.K. and Denmark. Countries with ex post selection
policies tend to have lower e¢ ciency ratios. Two exceptions are the U.S. and Sweden, where
the e¢ ciency is low despite the fact that these countries follow ex ante screening policies.
E¢ ciency in the U.S. is low, because only the universities set their own admission standards,
while community colleges o¤er open and a¤ordable access to many students (Long and
Kurlaender, 2009) These observations suggest that countries with ex ante screening policies
achieve higher graduation rates and are more e¢ cient than countries with ex post selection.
who passed the Swiss Matura (Cheps, 2011). In France, all pupils who possess a Baccalauréat are allowed to
enroll in university programs (Cheps, 2007). In Austria, pupils who pass the secondary leaving examinations,
typically can enroll in university studies of their choice (Helms, 2008).
8A weighted lottery system is used for admission to programs with capacity constraints In the Netherlands
(Boland and Mulrennan, 2011). All students receive a weight in the lottery, based on the score on the national
end exam. The best scoring students are automatically admitted.
9Entry and graduation rates are obtained from OECD statistics (OECD, 2012).
10Tertiary type A programs are largely theory-based programs designed to provide su¢ cient qualications
for entry to advanced research programs with high skill requirements. These programs are not exclusively
o¤ered at universities (OECD, 2012).
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Table 1: Admission policies and study e¢ ciency in university level programs
Admission policy Countries Enrollment Completion E¢ ciency
Ex ante screening and U.S. 74 38 51
tuition fees U.K. 63 51 81
Ireland 56 47 84
Ex ante screening but low Germany 42 30 71
or no tuition fees Sweden 76 37 49
Denmark 65 50 77
Ex post selection Italy 49 32 65
Switzerland 44 31 70
Austria 63 30 48
Netherlands 65 42 65
Note: Enrollment and completion rates are expresses in percentages of an age cohort.
E¢ ciency is calculated as the percentage of university graduates divided by the percentage
of university entrants.
Nevertheless, caution is warranted in drawing this conclusion, since the countries di¤er in
several respects and the data denitions are not entirely comparable across countries. In the
rest of this paper, we aim to provide more thorough conclusions based on a detailed analysis
of Belgium, the region of Flanders, which has an ex post selection system, representative for
the the third group of countries.
3 Higher education in Flanders
3.1 Institutional overview
Flanders is the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, located in the North. It consists of about 60%
of the population of 11 million inhabitants, compared with 40% in the French-speaking part,
which is located in the South and most of Brussels.11 Because of the di¤erent languages, both
higher education systems are quite closed systems, with only a limited number of students
attending universities and colleges in the other region. Nevertheless, because of their long
common history, both the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking educational system are quite
comparable in terms of screening and selection policies. The system is one of ex post selection
with no admission standards and low tuition fees. As discussed in Cantillon and Declercq
11A small minority of the Dutch-speaking part (about 10%) also lives in Brussels. There is also a small
German-speaking part in Belgium, located in the East (about 0.6% of the population)
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(2012), all pupils who obtained a high school diploma are entitled to start in most higher
education programs, regardless of their specic high school degree (Cantillon and Declercq,
2012). Institutions are not allowed to set their own admission standards. 12 Tuition fees are
also low, currently capped at 596.3 EUR in Flanders and 835 EUR in the French-speaking
community. Tuition fees in Flanders thus cover only 3% of the total costs of higher education
(Cantillon et al., 2006).
Two types of institutions o¤er higher education programs in Flanders: universities and
colleges.13 Universities o¤er programs with an academic focus, while colleges mainly o¤er
programs with a vocational focus (professional orientation). Both universities and colleges
o¤er programs in the four majors: sciences (SCI), biomedical sciences (BIOM), social sciences
(SSCI) and culture and languages (ARTS). There are ve universities, spread throughout
the region. They have a large size and o¤er a wide variety of study programs in all majors.
There are many more colleges (about 25), with a broad geographic coverage. They have a
considerably smaller size and they tend to specialize in a limited number of study programs,
often limited to one or at most two majors.
In sum, both universities and colleges have essentially no autonomy to screen students ex
ante, whether through admission standards or through tuition fees. They can however select
students ex post, as they have autonomy in giving credits based on studentsperformance in
courses. As a result, student success rates are very low, especially after the rst year. Less
than 50% successfully complete their required course work after the rst year, and there is
not only signicant drop-out but also substantial reorientation after the rst year.
3.2 A rst look at the data
In this paper, we use a rich dataset provided by the Flemish Ministry of Education to
investigate educational choices, ex post selection and reorientation decisions. We combine
two datasets from the Ministry. The secondary school dataset covers 55,524 high school
pupils who graduated from high school in 2001 (typically at the age of 18, if they incurred
no delay). The higher education dataset covers all students who start with higher education
in 2001, followed for a period of six years with information on their performance until they
graduate or drop out. As in Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010), we combine both datasets
so that we can identify which students start with a higher education and which students
immediately start working after completing high school.
12The government only imposes entry exams for a very limited number of programs, medicine at universities
and some artistic programs at colleges.
13We provide a brief overview. For more detailed information of the higher education landscape, see for
example Dassen and Luijten-Lub (2007).
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In the combined dataset, we observe various personal characteristics, including gender,
age, nationality, high school a¢ liation (catholic or not) and high school study program. There
are four types of high school: general, technical, artistic and professional. The general high
school type provides a stronger theoretical background, and prepares best for universities.
Technical and artistic high schools are more practically oriented, and prepare better towards
colleges. Professional high schools are more directly oriented towards the labor market, but
pupils can in principle also start any type of higher education degree if they complete one
extra preparatory year. As we will see, the distinction between the di¤erent high schools is
not always clear-cut, and many students from general high school start at colleges and the
reverse also occurs (to a lesser extent). We observe the students for a period of up to six
years, and assume they graduate after three years of successful coursework. This is equivalent
to obtaining a bachelor degree. This is a reasonably accurate description for colleges. For
universities, one has to add one or two years of coursework for obtaining the master degree.14
First-year enrollment and subsequent success Table 2 shows summary statistics for
all 55,524 pupils who nished high school in 2001. The top panel shows rst-year enrollment
rates (or entry rates) at colleges and universities, broken down by the type of high school
previously followed by the pupils (general versus other). 65% of the high school graduates
continue to start higher education. More pupils choose college programs (44.1%) than uni-
versity programs (20.9%). Pupils who graduated from a general high school are most likely
to start with higher education (87.3%), and they are comparatively more likely to go to
university (44.3%) than to college (43.0%). Pupils who graduated from another type of high
school (technical, artistic or professional) are less likely to start higher education (only 46.8),
and almost all go to colleges (45.0% versus only 1.8% to universities).
The next panels show success rates after the rst year and in subsequent years. After the
rst year, only 31.6% of high school graduates successfully complete their required course
work for that year. This is less than half of the 65.0% participating students. After three
years of studying, only 25.0% of the high school graduates have obtained their diploma in
time, which is less than 40% of the initially enrolled students. After six years15, 43.6% of the
high school graduates have obtained their diploma, which is about 67% of the participating
students. This is similar to the e¢ ciency ratios of most other countries with an ex post
selection system presented in Table 1 (Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland).
14The year 2001 was before the actual bachelor-master reform, but the total length of study remained the
same after the reform.
152.1% of the students have not obtained a degree in higher education after 6 years of studying. We assume
that they drop out of education after period 6. This leads to some right censored observations.
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It is also interesting to consider the break-down of success by universities and colleges, and
by type of high school. Pupils with a general high school are considerably more successful.
For example, 49.3% out of 87.3% general high school students successfully complete the rst
year in time, compared to only 17.0% out of 46.8% of the students from other types of high
school (technical, artistic and colleges). General high school students are also considerably
more likely to obtain their diploma within the required three years or after six years.
Table 2: Enrollment and success in higher education
university college total
Enrollment
All students 20.9 44.1 65.0
General HS 44.3 43.0 87.3
Other HS programs 1.8 45.0 46.7
Success after 1 year
All students 10.8 20.8 31.6
General HS 23.7 25.6 49.3
Other HS programs 0.2 16.8 17.0
Diploma after 3 years
All students 9.3 15.6 25.0
General HS 20.5 20.2 40.7
Other HS programs 0.2 11.9 12.1
Diploma after 6 years
All students 13.8 29.8 43.6
General HS 30.1 39.7 69.7
Other HS programs 0.4 21.7 22.2
Note: Percentage of high school graduates who choose for each option, based
on own calculations
Success rates are also lower at colleges than at universities, but the di¤erence is not
that large. For example, after the rst year 10.8% out of 20.9% of the university students
are successful, compared with 20.8% out of 44.1%. However, behind these numbers there
are extremely large di¤erences between general high school students and other high school
students. General high school students have a more than 50% success rate after the rst year:
23.7/44.3=53.5% at universities, and 25.6/43.0=59.5% at colleges. Students from other high
school types have much lower success rates after the rst year: only 16.8/45.0=37.0% at
colleges, and an extremely low 0.2/1.8=11.1% at universities. Similar conclusions hold for
success rates after 3 years and 6 years.
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Table A1 in Appendix 2 provides more detailed information on the role of student char-
acteristics (gender and delay during high school) and high school background (a break-down
of general high school in 7 groups, according to an orientation into mathematics, sciences,
classical languages, modern languages, economics and humanities; and a break-down of tech-
nical high schools in sciences, technology, management and other areas). We discuss the role
of these variables with some examples here. Males are less likely to start with higher edu-
cation (only 59.3%, compared with 70.4% of females). The gap between males and females
is even larger when looking at success rates: only 36.3% of males obtain their diploma after
six years, compared with 50.6% of females. Similarly, students who started education with
one year of delay (i.e. one year older than the usual 18) are less likely to participate in
higher education, and less likely to graduate, especially at universities. As a nal example,
students who took mathematics or classical language within a general high school type, have
the highest participation rates, especially at universities, and they also have the highest
graduation rates.
Reorientation in higher education During higher education, students may switch to
another program, especially if they were unsuccessful. Table 3 describes the number of
graduating students in specic majors (columns) as a percentage of the number of students
who started that major (row). This gives an indication of the importance of switching
behavior. According to the rst row, 66.9% of all participating students obtain a degree in
higher education. More students obtain a degree at colleges, especially within the major of
social sciences.
According to the subsequent rows, a majority of graduating students remain within their
major, but there is also substantial reorientation. Consider for example the second row, which
describes the outcomes of students who start a major in sciences at a university. 84.9% of
these students graduate, and a majority of 60.9% obtains the initially chosen major. But
an important fraction of 18.3% switches to obtain a college degree (especially in sciences or
social sciences). And a smaller fraction of 5.7% switches to another university major (mainly
biomedical sciences).
We observe similar switching patterns from other university majors. Most university
students eventually graduate within their initially chosen university major (diagonal in top
left panel). But an important fraction of 18.0% switches to colleges, especially to the twin
college major (diagonal in top right panel). The reverse occurs much less frequently: only
0.6% of the students who started at a college major obtain a diploma at a university (bottom
panel of Table 3). Students who started at a college major are more likely to switch to another
college major (if they do not drop out). The much stronger switching from universities to
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colleges than vice versa reects a cascade e¤ect: students start in the more di¢ cult majors
and update their choices depending on their successes. This ability sorting is also conrmed
by Arcidiacono (2004) and Stinebrickner and Stinenbrickner (2013).16 Table A2 in Appendix
2 illustrates that ability sorting is particularly strong after the rst year in higher education.
We show that a substantial fraction of the students who do not succeed for all courses in the
rst year of the program switch to another program or drop out of higher education.
Table 3: Reorientation and completion in higher education
Choice in University degree College degree Total
period 1 SCI BIOM SSCI ARTS Total SCI BIOM SSCI ARTS Total degree
All students 3.6 4.6 9.6 3.3 21.1 8.6 5.1 29.9 2.2 45.8 66.9
University
SCI 60.9 2.8 2.2 0.7 66.6 8.3 1.7 8.0 0.3 18.3 84.9
BIOM 1.4 67.1 1.7 0.8 71.0 2.2 7.7 6.2 0.2 16.3 87.3
SSCI 0.1 0.4 59.9 0.8 61.2 0.9 0.9 17.2 0.4 19.4 80.6
ARTS 0.0 0.1 2.3 61.9 64.3 0.6 0.4 12.8 2.0 15.8 80.1
Total 11.1 14.1 29.3 10.0 64.5 2.4 2.3 12.7 0.6 18.0 82.5
College
SCI 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.0 53.2 1.3 5.0 0.5 60.0 61.0
BIOM 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.0 53.9 5.7 0.1 60.7 61.1
SSCI 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.7 57.0 0.2 58.6 58.8
ARTS 0.1 0.2 1.2 0.6 2.1 1.0 0.6 14.5 42.9 59.0 61.1
Total 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.6 11.6 6.4 38.1 3.0 59.1 59.7
Note: The percentage of graduates in each major (columns) is expressed relative to the number of
students who start in each particular major (rows).
We can summarize this discussion as follows. The system of low tuition fees without
any ex ante screening procedures does not appear to have encouraged entry into higher
education, and has led to a low study e¢ ciency. Only 65% of the pupils who obtained a
high school diploma start with higher education, and less than 40% of these participating
students complete their rst three years within the foreseen time. A larger, but still not
very impressive fraction of 67% eventually completes the rst three years (within six years
16Note that because of this switching behavior it is possible that the number of graduates in a major is
larger than the number of starting students (as seen in Table A1 of Appendix 2). This will occur for students
who start at colleges and have a strong high school background (such as mathematics). Because of the ability
sorting, many students who started at universities with the same high school background will reorient and
switch to the college major.
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of study). Many students switch to other majors or drop out during their study path.
Switching especially occurs from university to college majors, and drop-out especially occurs
from colleges. These ndings suggest that there is room for improvement. In the next
sections, we develop and estimate a dynamic discrete choice model to assess whether this is
the case.
4 Empirical framework
We set up a dynamic discrete choice model of educational choice. We rst provide a brief
overview of the model within the institutional set-up. We then develop the dynamic choice
model in more detail. Finally, we discuss estimation and how we extend the model to account
for unobserved heterogeneity. We use the conditional choice probability (CCP) approach
developed by Hotz and Miller (1993) and further rened by Arcidiacono and Miller (2011)
to account for unobserved di¤erences in ability and educational benets/costs.
4.1 Overview
Our model closely follows the institutional environment as described in the previous section.
In each year t = 1; : : : ; T , students choose one of the available alternatives j = 0; : : : ; J . A
study option j = 1; : : : ; J refers to one of the four possible majors (SCI, BIOM, SSCI or
ARTS) at ve possible universities or at the nearest college. The option j = 0 refers to the
decision to drop out and enter the labor market.17
Students have to accumulate three credits (=years of coursework) to obtain their diploma.
Credit accumulation is uncertain, and follows a simple law of motion: at the end of period t,
the number of accumulated credits isXt+1 = Xt+1 if the student is succesful, andXt+1 = Xt
if she fails. If students have accumulated 3 credits, they enter the labor market and earn
wages according to their obtained diploma. If students drop out before accumulating 3
credits, they also enter the labor market and earn the drop-out wage.
The specic timing therefore works as follows:
1. In period t = 1, each high school graduate can choose any study option j = 1; : : : ; J , or
the drop-out option j = 0. At the end of period 1, a student observes her performance,
i.e. whether she successfully accumulated 1 credit.
17Since one of the ve universities does not o¤er ARTS as a major, the total number of study options is
24 (1 drop-out option, 19 options at universities, and 4 options at colleges).
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2. In subsequent periods t > 1, students decide whether to continue their program, to
switch to another program, or to drop out, conditional on the observed performance
at the end of period t   1. At the end of period t, a student again observes her
performance.
3. If a student has succesfully accumulated 3 credits, she obtains her diploma, starts
working and earns the wage corresponding to the obtained degree. If she drops out
before accumulating 3 credits, she starts working and earns the drop-out wage.
4.2 Dynamic choice model
4.2.1 Flow utility and credit accumulation
Flow utility In each year t, a student chooses an option j = 0; : : : ; J , where j = 0 is the
drop-out option and the remaining j > 0 are the various study options. A students decision
in period t is given by dt =
 
d0t ; d
1
t ; : : : ; d
J
t

, where djt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
alternative is chosen and 0 otherwise.18 The ow utility of a study option j > 0 in period
t consists of the current consumption value and costs (distinct from future benets in the
form of increased earnings after obtaining a diploma). This ow utility is given by
ujt(S0; C
j; Xt; dt 1) = 
j
1S0 + 2C
j + 3Xt + 
j
4dt 1 + "
j
t : (1)
A students ow utility in period t thus depends on a vector of time-invariant student char-
acteristics S0, such as gender and high school background. It also depends on travel costs
Cj, given by the distance between the students location and the location of option j. Fur-
thermore, a students utility may depend on the number of accumulated credits Xt at the
start of period t. This is related to Arcidiacono (2004), who allows utility to depend on the
study result of the previous period. A students utility in addition depends on the option
chosen in the previous period, dt 1. This allows for switching costs from taking a major that
is di¤erent from the previously taken one. Joensen (2009) also includes the option chosen
in the previous period as a determinant of utility. We will allow switching costs from and
to any major to be di¤erent. This is more general than Arcidiacono (2004), who assumes
that switching costs are the same regardless of the origin of the switching. Finally, utility
depends on an error term "jt , which is i.i.d. across individuals and options, according to the
distributional assumptions of the logit model.
The ow utility of the drop-out option j = 0 depends on the drop-out wage, given the
individuals characteristics. We normalize the other utility components in the drop-out option
to zero, so that u0t (S0) = 5w
0
t (S0) + "
0
t .
18To simplify notation we omit the subscript for an individual student.
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Credit accumulation Credit accumulation is uncertain, and follows a simple law of mo-
tion. Prior to education, the number of accumulated credits is X0 = 0. At the end of period
t = 1; : : : ; T , the number of accumulated credits is Xt+1 = Xt + 1 if the student is succesful
and Xt+1 = Xt if she fails. The probability of success is 
j
t(S0; Xt; t), which depends on
individual characteristics S0, on previously accumulated credits Xt and on the number of
study years t. The probability of success may di¤er between programs, hence the superscript
j.
If students have accumulated X credits, they enter the labor market and earn wages
wj (S0) according to their obtained diploma j and individual characteristics S0. If students
drop out before accumulating X credits, they also enter the labor market and earn the drop-
out wage w0 (S0). In our application, we consider X = 3, so we assume a diploma is obtained
after the rst three years, corresponding to the Bachelors degree.19
4.2.2 Optimization problem
We assume that individuals choose an option j in every period t to maximize the present
discounted value of their lifetime utilities, using a discount factor . To simplify notation,
dene t = (S0; Cj; dt 1; t) as the vector of state variables in period t observed by the
econometrician (as opposed to the state variables "t =
 
"0t ; : : : ; "
J
t

that are only known
to the individual). To model the dynamic optimization problem, the starting point is the
individuals conditional value function, i.e. her value function conditional on choosing option
j. In our set-up, the conditional value function for a given study option j = 1; : : : ; J is given
by
V jt (t; Xt) = u
j
t(t; Xt) + 
h
jt eVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1) + (1  jt)eVt+1(t+1; Xt)i ; (2)
where eVt+1(t+1; Xt) and eVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1) represent the expected value functions, the
continuation value of behaving optimally from period t + 1 onwards when respectively Xt
and Xt + 1 credits have been accumulated. Intuitively, the value of choosing option j in
period t is equal to the sum of two components: the direct ow utility of choosing option j
in period t and the discounted expected future value. This expected future value, in turn,
depends on the probability of successful credit accumulation. With probability jt(S0; Xt; t)
the individual successfully accumulates an extra credit and receives a continuation valueeVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1). With probability 1   jt(S0; Xt; t) the individual is not succesful and
receives a continuation value eVt+1(t+1; Xt).
The conditional value function for j = 0 is much simpler because it is a terminal action.
19In practice, almost all students continue with a Master degree. There is however very limited switching
after three years, so that incorporating this would have only limited impact on the analysis.
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If j = 0 because of drop-out before graduation (Xt < X), the student earns the drop-out
wage, so her conditional value function is
V 0t (t; Xt) = 5
TX
t=1
t 1w0t (S0); (3)
where T = 40 is the number of years the individual works after dropout. If instead j = 0
because the student has obtained a diploma (Xt = X), the student earns the wage according
to her obtained diploma, so
V 0t (t; X) = 5
TX
t=1
t 1wjt (S0);
when her previous period choice dt 1 was option j (so that she obtained a diploma for
option j).
As in Rust (1987) we assume that the unobserved factors are independently and iden-
tically type 1 extreme value distributed. For the moment, we also impose the conditional
independence assumption. This assumption implies that the unobserved state at t has no
e¤ect on the observed state at t+ 1 after controlling for both the decision and the observed
state at t. In the last subsection, we will relax this assumption to allow for unobserved
factors to inuence utility and success and for serial correlation of these unobserved e¤ects,
following Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). Under these assumptions there is a closed form
solution for the expected value function, known as the logsum formula (McFadden, 1979):
eVt+1(t+1; Xt+1) =  + log " JX
j=0
exp(V jt+1(t+1; Xt+1))
#
; (4)
where  is Eulers constant and either Xt+1 = Xt (no successful credict accumulation) or
Xt+1 = Xt+1 (successful credit accumulation). Furthermore, there is an analytic expression
for the probability that an individual chooses an option j in period t:
Pr(djt = 1jt; Xt) =
exp(V jt (t; Xt))PJ
j=0 exp(V
j
t (t; Xt))
: (5)
In principle, these dynamic choice probabilities (5) can be taken to the data, after substi-
tuting (4) into (2), and (2) into (5), i.e. after substituting the expected value functionseVt+1(t+1; Xt) and eVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1) into the conditional value functions, and substituting
these in turn into the choice probabilities.
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4.2.3 CCP representation of the expected value function
In practice, the computation of the dynamic choice probabilities (5) creates a dimensionality
problem, because one must determine the expected payo¤s for all possible future choice paths.
Following Hotz and Miller (1993), we address this problem by representing the expected value
function in terms of future conditional choice probabilities (CCPs). These CCPs can then
be treated as data instead of as functions of the underlying parameters.
In our institutional set-up, the CCP approach to computing the expected value func-
tion simplies, and it only requires one-period-ahead choice probabilities. This is because
individuals can always choose a terminal action at which point the decision problem is no
longer dynamic; see also Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011) for a detailed discussion. This
terminal action is drop out before graduation, after which the student earns the drop-out
wage according to V 0t (t; Xt) as given by (3). To compute the expected value function with
a one-period ahead probability, the key preliminary step is to write the probability that the
student chooses to drop out at period t+ 1 before obtaining a diploma:
Pr(d0t+1 = 1jt+1; Xt+1) =
exp
 
V 0t+1(t+1; Xt+1)
PJ
j=0 exp(V
j
t+1(t+1; Xt+1))
:
We can rearrange this and take logarithms, to substitute the logsum term into (4). This
gives the following expression for the expected value function:
eVt+1(t+1; Xt+1) =  + V 0t+1(t+1; Xt+1)  log  Pr(d0t+1 = 1jt+1; Xt+1) ; (6)
where V 0t+1(t+1; Xt+1) is given by (3) and Pr(d
0
t+1 = 1jt+1; Xt+1) can be interpreted as
the empirical hazard rate of drop-out, which can be estimated from the data. Hence, the
complicated expression for the value function (4) has been simplied into (6), which only
depends on the drop-out payo¤s in a terminating state and on an adjustment term that
depends on the empirical hazard rate of drop-out. We can then substitute (6) (instead of
(4)) into (2), and substitute (2) into (5) to compute the choice probabilities that can be
taken to the data.
In Appendix 1, we summarize the details of these substitutions, distinguising between
two possible cases: (1) Xt < X 1, i.e. periods where the student does not yet have a chance
to graduate, and (2) Xt = X   1, periods where the student has a chance to graduate (with
probability jt).
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4.3 Estimation
4.3.1 Basic model
The assumptions of Rust (1987) imply that there is no unobserved heterogeneity in the
model and no serial correlation of the unobserved factors.
An individual is contribution to the log likelihood function in period t lnLit(; ) then
becomes additively separable and equal to the sum of the log likelihood contribution of
college and major choices lnL1it() and the log likelihood contribution of success lnL2it().
The log likelihood function (7) is given by:
lnL(; ) =
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
ln (L1it() + lnL2it()) ; (7)
where L1it() is given by the choice probabilities (5) and L2it() is given by the success
probability jit(S0; Xt; t).
Because of the additive separability of the likelihood function, we can estimate the model
in a 2-step procedure as described in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). In the rst step, we
predict wages, success probabilities and the probability of drop-out for each student in each
state. First, we use an OLS regression to predict the wage path for each individual with
all options j (including the drop-out option). We use a dataset about wages in Flanders
and assume that students expect their wages to be the same as observed wages of workers
with similar characteristics. Second, we predict the success probabilities for each student
in each possible state based on a exible binary logit specication with a larger number
of variables and interactions. Third, we predict the conditional probabilities of choosing
the drop-out option in each state for all students with a exible binary logit model (as
a hazard rate model). In the second step, we then use the estimation results of the rst
stage to compute the choice probabilities using the CCP approach with one-period ahead
probabilities of drop-out as adjustment term, as discussed above with additional details in
Appendix 1. By applying the CCP approach, estimating the dynamic discrete choice model
reduces to estimating a static discrete choice model with a correction term.
4.3.2 Extension to unobserved heterogeneity
The basic model incorporates a rich set of student characteristics, but there may still be
unobserved factors determining student preferences and success and these factors may be
correlated over time. For example, students with an unobserved high preference for sciences
in the rst period may also have a high preference for sciences in the following periods.
To account for such unobserved heterogeneity, we follow Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) and
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assume there exists a xed numberM of student types, who di¤er in preferences and success
rates. Let m be the probability that a student belongs to type m. An individual i of type m
in period t has a choice probability L1imt() and a success probability L2imt(), where some
of the parameters may be specic to her type. We then obtain the following log likelihood
function (8)
lnL(; ) =
NX
n=1
ln
 
MX
m=1
 
m
TY
t=1
(L1imt() L2imt())
!!
(8)
The log likelihood function is no longer additively separable. We can use the Expectations
Maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate the model. This algorithm consists of 2 steps. In
the rst step, we take as given the probability m that an individual belongs to type m, and
we maximize the likelihood with respect to the parameters  and . In the second step, we
update the probability that individual i belongs to type m by using the likelihood function.
We repeat this procedure until convergence.
To estimate the model, we have a very large number of observations: 55,524 high school
pupils who can choose between 24 study options (including the no-study option) during up
to 6 periods. We also include a large number of variables, and the unobserved heterogeneity
parameters. To make estimation manageable, we randomly sample 60% of the pupils.
5 Empirical results
In this section, we discuss the estimates of the model. We rst discuss our empirical ndings
on wages and success probabilities. While these results are of stand-alone interest, they
mainly serve as building blocks for our dynamic discrete choice model, which we discuss in
the second part of this section.
5.1 Wages and success
Wages Wages a¤ect student decisions in two ways in our model. First, they directly enter
the drop-out payo¤s, through the future drop-out wage prole w0t (S0). Second, they enter
the payo¤s when the student graduates, through the wage prole wjt (S0) after obtaining
a diploma for study option j. To estimate future wages under alternative diplomas, we
make use of a large survey dataset, Vacature salarisenquete, containing information for
37,434 workers in Flanders in 2006. We observe gross wages, diploma, municipality, personal
characteristics of the workers and years of experience. We use this information to predict
the wages of students for each possible diploma. Region dummies serve as an exclusion
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restriction, i.e. these variables only a¤ect wages and do not directly a¤ect the utility of
attending college or university. We obtain the following intuitive ndings represented in Table
A3 in Appendix 2. Workers with a college or university degree earn on average signicantly
more than workers without a degree in higher education. Wage premiums are signicantly
higher for university graduates than for college graduates, and for workers with a degree in
the elds of sciences or biomedical sciences at university (as compared with social sciences or
arts). Males earn on average higher wages. Finally, wages increase with years of experience
(seniority), and this increasing wage path di¤ers across study options.
Success rates The success probabilities jt(S0; Xt; t) a¤ect student decisions, because they
inuence the likelihood and the speed at which students obtain a diploma and earn a higher
wage. To obtain these probabilities we estimate a binary logit model for success, accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity by including two discrete types. We estimate the model based
on all students in our main dataset, which we discussed earlier in section 3. We consider a
exible specication, including the following determinants: the number of previously accu-
mulated credits Xt, the year of study t and a rich set of personal and high school background
characteristics interacted with all possible study options. We also include the network of the
students high school (catholic versus state), which serves as an exclusion restriction: it may
a¤ect the success rate at university or college, but does not directly a¤ect study decisions.
We briey summarize the main results here, and present the complete set of results in
Table A4 of Appendix 2. Based on the parameter estimates, Figure 1 summarizes how the
success probabilities vary with the number of credits (or successful years) Xt, and with the
number of years of delay t Xt. The histogram shows that success rates are especially low
in the rst year (less than 50%). Success rates are higher for students without study delay
in periods 2 and 3 (approximately 90%). Success rates decrease with the number of years of
delay.
Several personal characteristics play an important role in predicting success rates. Males
and students who complete high school with at least one year of delay have signicantly lower
success rates in all options. Students from a catholic high school are more likely to succeed.
High school background also predicts the success probability in higher education: students
with a general high school background have signicantly higher success rates at all programs
than students from technical, artistic or vocational high schools. The specic program
within a general high school also plays an important role: programs with mathematics,
classical languages or sciences imply much higher success rates. Finally, we nd that there is
unobserved heterogeneity (as modeled through di¤erent intercepts for the program options
for two types): type 1 individuals have signicantly higher success rates in all program
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options except at arts programs at college. This e¤ect is stronger for university than for
college programs. One might therefore interpret the type 1 individuals as academic types.
We return to this interpretation when discussing the results from the dynamic discrete choice
model.
Figure 1: Success probabilities in each period
5.2 Dynamic discrete choice model
We now turn to the empirical results of our dynamic discrete choice model, i.e. the para-
meters that enter the choice probabilities Pr(djt = 1jt; Xt) for the various options j, as a
function of the number of previously accumulated credits Xt, and the other state variables
t = (S0; C
j; dt 1; t), i.e. time-invariant personal characteristics S0, previous period choice
dt 1, and travel cost Cj. The vector of personal characteristics S0 consists of gender, de-
lay in high school and high school background characteristics. We set the discount factor
 = 0:95, similar to other studies. As discussed in the model section, we normalize the utility
of the drop-out option to zero (with the exception of the drop-out wage), so the parameter
estimates should be interpreted relative to the drop-out option as the reference category.
Table 4 shows the empirical results. Because the model has a large number of parame-
ters, Table 4 only shows the parameters relating to the unobserved type alternative specic
constants, previously accumulated credits Xt, travel cost Cj, earnings and previous period
choices dt 1 (capturing switching costs). To save space, Table 4 does not show the estimated
e¤ects of the personal characteristics on the utility of the four university and college majors
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(which amount to 9 demographic variables interacted with 4 majors at university and 15
demographic variables interacted with 4 majors at college). We will briey discuss these
here, and refer to Table A5 in Appendix 2 for the complete set of results.
Table 4 shows that it is important to control for unobserved heterogeneity. From the
intercepts for the program options, we see that type 1 individuals obtain more utility from
studying than type 2 individuals. This e¤ect is stronger for university programs than for
college programs. In the previous section, we already saw that type 1 individuals have higher
success rates in all options. Type 1 can thus be interpreted as the academic type. They are
more likely to participate in higher education and they also have higher success rates. This
interpretation is similar as in Arcidiacono (2004) and Joensen (2009).
Students are highly sensitive to travel distance Cj, consistent with earlier ndings of
Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010) for rst year students. Students also positively value
future expected wages upon graduation. Furthermore, good performance increases the utility
of continuing higher education: the more credits Xt a student already has obtained, the more
likely she will continue at a college or university major. This is consistent with Arcidiaconos
(2004) ndings for the U.S. Finally, there are signicant switching costs (as captured by dt 1),
and they di¤er between the several options. They are the highest for students who want to
switch from college to university, and the lowest for students who switch from university to
college (with the same major). Switching to other majors is also costly. Switching to social
sciences is least costly, while switching to sciences is usually most costly.
We also briey comment on the role of personal characteristics in educational choice
(j1, shown in Appendix). Male students have a strong preference for scientic programs,
while female students prefer programs in biomedical sciences. High school background also
inuences the utility of studying. Pupils with a general high school degree are much more
likely to start higher education, especially at universities instead of colleges. Pupils with a
mathematical high school background have a strong preference for sciences and biomedical
sciences. Pupils with a technical or artistic high school degree are more likely to start at
colleges as compared with pupils with a vocational high school degree.
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Table 4: Dynamic discrete choice model
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Unobserved type alternative-specic constants
type 1 type 2
SCI UNIV -4.820* (0.104) -9.854* (0.130)
BIOM UNIV -4.362* (0.111) -9.175* (0.131)
SSCI UNIV -3.283* (0.072) -6.872* (0.086)
ARTS UNIV -3.431* (0.085) -7.774* (0.112)
SCI COLL -3.718* (0.101) -5.750* (0.107)
BIOM COLL -3.593* (0.121) -6.060* (0.129)
SSCI COLL -1.949* (0.047) -2.912* (0.045)
ARTS COLL -4.492* (0.135) -6.411* (0.143)
type m probability (m) 39.3% 60.7%
Utility parameters
student characteristics (j1) included, see table A5
travel distance (2) -0.298* (0.003)
credits (3) 1.955* (0.024)
earnings (5) 0.005* (0.000)
Switching parameters (4)
djt d
j
t 1
SCI BIOM -4.238* (0.096)
SSCI -4.253* (0.073)
ARTS -4.626* (0.139)
BIOM SCI -3.075* (0.086)
SSCI -3.750* (0.069)
ARTS -5.217* (0.213)
SSCI SCI -2.558* (0.050)
BIOM -3.371* (0.050)
ARTS -2.859* (0.054)
ARTS SCI -3.147* (0.127)
BIOM -4.434* (0.189)
SSCI -3.460* (0.077)
UNIV COLL -5.436* (0.072)
COLL UNIV -0.470* (0.034)
 0.95 (0)
Note: Sample of 60% of 55,524 high school graduates, 24 choice alternatives, up to 6 periods
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
c Base category = same option in the previous period
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6 Counterfactual analysis
We use the estimates of our model to evaluate the e¤ects of alternative, hypothetical admis-
sion policies in higher education. Before performing our policy counterfactuals, we assessed
how well the model predicts the actual outcomes, and we found it does reasonably well, as
shown in the top two panels of Table 5. For example, 65.0% of the high school students en-
roll in higher education, while the model predicts 65.1%. Similarly, 31.6% of the high school
students successfully completed the rst year and 25.0% obtain their diploma within three
years, while the model predicts 30.4% and 22.2%, respectively.
We then considered two policy counterfactuals to assess the e¤ects of introducing ad-
mission standards. Our rst policy counterfactual considers an admission standard that is
uniform across all programs. Our second policy counterfactual considers a discriminatory
admission standard that only applies to universities (where success rates are lower) and not
to colleges.
Generally speaking, raising admission standards involves the following possible trade-
o¤. On the one hand, it reduces rst-year enrollment, but on the other hand it induces
students to shift to other programs, where they have higher success probabilities. As a result,
increasing the admission standard reduces initial enrollment, but it may increase the number
of students who succesfully obtain their degree after three years or after six years. After
outlining our approach (subsection 6.1), we show the e¤ects of raising admission standards
on overall educational attainment (subsection 6.2). Finally, we focus on the optimal admission
standards (which maximize overall educational attainment) to assess how this induces shifts
from university to college programs (subsection 6.3).
6.1 Approach
There are several ways in which one may implement the admission standards. A rst ap-
proach would be to base admission standards on high school background, e.g. only admit
students with a strong mathematics background to sciences, students with a su¢ cient lan-
guage background to arts, etc. An alternative approach would be to consider the e¤ect of
an entry exam.
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Table 5: Predictions and policy counterfactuals
university college total
Observed choices and study outcomes (percentage)
Enrollment 20.9 44.1 65.0
Success after 1 year 10.8 20.8 31.6
Diploma after 3 years 9.3 15.6 25.0
Diploma after 6 years 13.8 29.8 43.6
Predictions of dynamic model (percentage)
Enrollment 26.2 38.9 65.1
Success after 1 year 11.9 18.5 30.4
Diploma after 3 years 8.9 13.3 22.2
Diploma after 6 years 14.4 22.3 36.7
Optimal uniform admission standard (percentage point change)a
Enrollment -6.5 +1.0 -5.5
Success after 1 year -0.9 +2.0 +1.1
Diploma after 3 years -0.1 +1.1 +1.0
Diploma after 6 years -0.3 +1.7 +1.4
Optimal discriminatory admission standard, university programs only
(percentage point change)a
Enrollment -10.0 +8.1 -1.9
Success after 1 year -2.0 +4.6 +2.6
Diploma after 3 years -0.5 +2.4 +1.9
Diploma after 6 years -1.4 +3.7 +2.3
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2001
high school graduates. Predicted outcomes of admission policies are expressed
as percentage point changes relative to the status quo.
a Optimal standardrefers to the threshold that maximizes the number of
graduates in higher education after 6 years.
The rst approach is consistent with admission policies in some countries, and it is
feasible with our data. But it is inevitably somewhat ad hoc, since there are many possible
selection criteria.20 The second approach is a realistic description for several countries, but
it cannot be directly implemented in our case, since entry exams did not take place. We
20We nevertheless implemented this approach. For example, we imposed admission criteria based on high-
school background, where only pupils with a highschool background in mathematics, classical languages or
sciences can start university, while all pupils can start college. We found that this policy has similar e¤ects
to an entry limited to university programs, which we discuss below.
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therefore followed a variation of this second approach that mimics the e¤ect of entry exams:
we select students based on their rst year success rates as predicted by the model. For
example, we can introduce an admission standard in such a way that only pupils with a
predicted success rate of at least 50% can start the program. More generally, we can vary
the toughness of the admission standard by only allowing students to enter a program if they
have a predicted success rate above an admission threshold of X%. An admission threshold
of 0% is the current status quo situation, where even students with 0% success rates are
accepted. A positive but low admission threshold means a lax policy, while a high threshold
means a strict policy and a threshold of 100% means that only students with guaranteed
success are admitted. This approach incorporates in a systematic way all observed student
characteristics that are relevant for success rates (in particular, high school background
characteristics, which we found important predictors of success in the previous section) and
also unobserved student characteristics captured by the di¤erent student types.
6.2 The impact of raising admission standards
Figure 2 shows the impact of uniform admission standards on educational attainment, as
predicted by the model. We consider admission thresholds X% that are uniform across
programs, and we vary the thresholds between 0% (the current situation) and 100% (no one
is admitted). Figure 2 shows that the enrollment rate slowly decreases for low admission
thresholds, and decreases faster for high thresholds. For example, raising the threshold from
0% to 20% reduces rst-year participation from 65.1% to 62.1%, while raising the threshold
further from 20% to 40% reduces rst-year participation to 52.0% and raising the threshold
from 40% to 60% further reduces enrollment to only 29.0%.
Despite the drop in initial enrollment, successful degree completion increases for low
admission thresholds, and it only decreases mildly for intermediate thresholds. Only under
su¢ ciently tight thresholds there is an important reduction in successful degree completion.
For example, under the current 0% threshold 22.2% of high school students receive a degree
after three years and 36.7% receive their degree after six years. An admission threshold of 20%
raises these success rates to respectively 22.8% and 37.7%, and a tighter admission standard
of 30% raises it further to 23.2% and 38.0%. However, a strict admission standard of 50%
reduces degree completion to respectively 21.1% and 32.3%. In other words, introducing low
or intermediate admission thresholds (below 40%) involves no main tradeo¤ from a policy
perspective. On the one hand, it reduces rst-year overall enrollment and hence requires
lower educational resources. On the other hand, it also increases successful degree completion
after 3 and 6 years, since it induces students to shift more quickly to programs according to
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their abilities. Tighter admission standards (above 40%) decrease enrollment further, but
also lead to a decrease in degree completion.
Figure 2: Uniform admission standards
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Figure A2 in Appendix 2 shows the impact on educational attainment of a similar ex-
periment, i.e. discriminatory admission thresholds that only apply to university programs
and not to college programs. This shows that admission thresholds limited to university
programs only slightly decrease initial enrollment. But they raise overall degree completion
after three and six years because of shifts from university to college programs, where the
success rates are higher.
6.3 Optimal admission standards
To explore the shifts from university to college programs further, we now focus on optimal
admission standards, i.e. admission thresholds that maximize the total number of graduates
after 6 years (both for the uniform and discriminatory case). While this is not necessary an
optimal policy in all respects, it reects a broader policy objective to maximize attainment
in higher education within a reasonable time frame. The uniform admission threshold that
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maximizes success after 6 years turns out to be 28% (the peak on the relevant line in Figure
2), while the discriminatory university admission threshold that maximizes success after 6
years is 42% (parallel peak in Figure A2).
Table 5 shows the results. The top two panels were discussed earlier and show the
actual and predicted enrollment and completion rates. The third panel shows the changes
in successful completion rates under a uniform admission threshold of 28%, and the bottom
panel shows the changes in successful completion rates under a discriminatory admission
policy of 42%.
Regarding the uniform admission threshold, we obtain the following ndings. First-year
participation sharply drops by 5.5% points (from 65.1% to 59.6%). The decrease only applies
to universities (-6.5% points); there is even an increase in rst-year participation at colleges
(+1.0% points). This is because the admission threshold induces a shift from universities
to colleges: intuitively, students with very low expected success rates at universities (below
28%) will now choose other programs at colleges where they have higher success rates.
Furthermore, despite the sharp drop in rst-year participation, the number of students who
obtain a diploma increases, by 1.0% points after three years and by 1.4% points after six
years. This increase can be fully attributed to colleges (+1.1% points after three years and
+1.7% points after six years). At the same time, the drop in university diplomas is negligible
(only -0.1% points after three years and -0.3% points after six years).
Regarding the discriminatory admission threshold to universities only, we obtain the
following interesting additional ndings. First-year participation also decreases, but by less
than under a uniform threshold (-1.9% points instead of -5.5% points). At the same time,
the number of successful students after three years and six years increases by more (+1.9%
points and +2.3% points, compared with +1.0% points and +1.4% points under a uniform
threshold). In other words, a discriminatory threshold that only limits access to universities
implies lower savings in educational resources, but it also has a higher benet in terms of
eventual educational attainment. This conclusion is conrmed when we consider the shifts
from universities to colleges: the discriminatory threshold implies a very sharp reduction
of rst-year university participation (-10.0% points versus -6.5% points under a uniform
threshold), and an equally sharp shift to colleges (+8.1% points versus only +1.0% points
under a uniform threshold). The consequence is a larger number of diplomas at colleges
(+2.4% points after three years and +3.7% points after six years), but also a decline in the
number of diplomas at universities (0.5% points after three years and -1.4% points after six
years).
The above discussion focused on how admission standards induce shifts from universities
to colleges, raising student success rates. The admission standards also induce shifts within
29
universities and within colleges to di¤erent majors. These are somewhat less pronounced,
but they also help explaining how admission standards can raise the number of graduates.
To summarize, moderate admission thresholds can save on educational resources (in the
sense of reducing unsuccessful participation), while at the same timing increasing overall
educational attainment (both the speed and ultimate number of graduates after 6 years). A
uniform admission standard has the largest resource savings, and turns out not to involve
any tradeo¤s, since it increases the number of college graduates without reducing the number
of university graduates. A discriminatory admission standard has lower resource savings, but
increases the number of graduates by even more. At the same time, however, a discriminatory
admission standard involves some tradeo¤: the number of college graduates sharply increases,
at the expense of the number of university graduates, which slightly decreases.
7 Conclusion
We have studied how a higher education system without ex ante admission policies and only
ex post student selection inuences enrollment and completion. We developed a dynamic
discrete choice model of college/university and major choice, where the outcome of the
enrollment decision is uncertain. Upon observing past performance, students may decide
to continue, reorient or drop out, thereby balancing their current costs and benets against
future expected benets on the labor market. We accounted for the impact of a rich set of
demographics and high school background characteristics on choices and study success, and
we also controlled for unobserved heterogeneity inuencing this process.
We applied our model to the region of Flanders, where there is essentially no ex ante
screening and very strong ex post selection, especially after the rst year. Success rates
after the rst year are low (less than 50%), but highly predictable by student characteristics
(such as high school track record). Gender, high school background and distance to univer-
sity/college play an important role in studentsdecisions of college/university and major.
Furthermore, the dynamics show persistency in choices but also interesting switching behav-
ior. Unsuccessful students mainly switch from university to college majors, or from college
majors to drop-out. As a result, less than 40% of the students complete their rst three years
without delay and many need up to six years. This implies large losses from mismatching in
the form of reorientation or drop-out.
We use the estimates to evaluate the e¤ects of introducing ex ante admission policies. Our
counterfactuals show that an ex ante screening system with modest admission thresholds can
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increase overall degree completion in higher education. First, we consider a uniform admis-
sion standard that applies to both colleges and universities. A modest admission threshold
can reduce the rst-year entry rate by 5.5% points, and at the same time increase overall
educational attainment after six years by up to 1.4% points (+1.7% points at colleges and a
negligible 0.3% points at universities). This is because the admission threshold induces a
strong shift in the rst year from universities to colleges, by students who would have had
very low probability of success. Second, we consider a discriminatory admission standard
which only applies to universities and not to colleges. A more restrictive admission thresh-
old can reduce the rst-year entry rate by 1.9% points, and raise educational attainment
after six years by 2.3% points. However, this increase in educational attainment involves a
large shift from universities to colleges: there is a large increase in college diplomas (+3.7%
points), which comes at the expense of university diplomas (1.4% points).
In sum, a suitably designed ex ante screening system can increase degree completion in
higher education. A mild uniform admission standard turns out not to involve any trade-
o¤s: it reduces the number of rst-year entrants, and increases success rates and overall
educational attainment after six years. A discriminatory admission standard to universities
only can improve overall attainment by even more, but it involves trading o¤ an increase in
college graduates against a loss in university graduates.
The implied educational resource savings have a direct positive impact on government
budgets. These savings can be used for general purposes, but also to make additional invest-
ments in the higher educational system, for example investments in the quality of education,
or additional scholarships to groups from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. There are
also indirect resource savings from faster educational attainment, as students enter more
quickly on the labor market. In future research, it would be interesting to conduct a more
complete welfare analysis, by matching our data on educational choices directly to data on
labor market outcomes.
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Appendix 1: Details on the dynamic model
In this Appendix, we provide more details on how the expected value functions enter the
choice probabilities. As discussed in the text, the probability that an individual chooses an
option j in period t is given by:
Pr(djt = 1jt; Xt) =
exp(V jt (t; Xt))PJ
j=0 exp(V
j
t (t; Xt))
; (9)
where the conditional value function for a given option j is given by
V jt (t; Xt) = u
j
t(t; Xt) + 
h
jt eVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1) + (1  jt)eVt+1(t+1; Xt)i ; (10)
To compute the expected value functions eVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1) and eVt+1(t+1; Xt), there are
two possible cases:
Case 1 : No su¢ cient credits to graduate at the end of period t (Xt < X   1)
If at time t a student has only accumulated Xt < X   1 credits, there is no chance she
will graduate at the end of period t, so we can write:eVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1) =  + V 0t+1(t+1; Xt + 1)  log  Pr(d0t+1 = 1jt+1; Xt + 1) (11)eVt+1(t+1; Xt) =  + V 0t+1(t+1; Xt)  log  Pr(d0t+1 = 1jt+1; Xt) ; (12)
and substitute these expressions into the condition value functions (10) entering the choice
probabilities (9).
Case 2 : Su¢ cient credits to graduate (Xt = X   1)
If at time t a student has accumulated Xt = X 1 su¢ cient credits, there is a probability
(jt) that she will graduate at the end of period t and enter the labor market with a diploma.
In this case we can write:
eVt+1(t+1; Xt + 1) = 5 TX
t=1
t 1wjt (S0) (13)
eVt+1(t+1; Xt) =  + V 0t+1(t+1; Xt)  log  Pr(d0t+1 = 1jt+1; Xt) ; (14)
and substitute these expressions into the condition value functions (10) entering the choice
probabilities (9).
Appendix 2: Additional tables and gures
Enrollment and study outcomes
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Table A2: Reorienation of failed rst year students
Choice in Choice in period 2
period 1 University College Total
SCI BIOM SSCI ARTS Total SCI BIOM SSCI ARTS Total
University
SCI 54.8 2.8 4.9 1.3 63.8 15.2 1.7 15.2 0.6 32.7 96.5
BIOM 3.5 53.3 5.2 2.5 64.5 6.1 13.2 12.5 0.8 32.6 97.1
SSCI 0.2 1.0 57.0 2.3 60.5 2.1 1.8 29.4 1.7 35.0 95.5
ARTS 0.2 0.3 5.1 53.9 59.5 1.9 1.0 24.8 5.8 33.5 93.0
College
SCI 0.2 0.6 1.6 0.6 3.0 49.8 2.3 14.4 0.9 67.4 70.4
BIOM 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.1 2.2 44.9 19.6 0.5 67.2 68.3
SSCI 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.3 2.5 2.0 58.4 0.9 63.8 65.1
ARTS 0.0 0.4 3.0 2.2 5.6 4.2 1.3 29.5 40.0 75.0 80.6
Note: The columns represent the proportion of failed students who choose for each option in period 2
given their choice in period 1.
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Wages
Table A3: Determinants of log wages
Variables Coe¢ cient St. error
majors
SCIuniv 0.333* (0.037)
BIOMuniv 0.371* (0.072)
SSCIuniv 0.274* (0.028)
ARTSuniv 0.177* (0.042)
SCIcoll 0.172* (0.037)
BIOMcoll 0.080 (0.107)
SSCIcoll 0.160* (0.029)
ARTScoll 0.179* (0.066)
gender
male 0.191* (0.005)
SCIuniv -0.059* (0.014)
BIOMuniv -0.098* (0.025)
SSCIuniv -0.039* (0.010)
ARTSuniv -0.111* (0.020)
SCIcoll -0.061* (0.011)
BIOMcoll -0.057* (0.020)
SSCIcoll -0.031* (0.008)
ARTScoll -0.085* (0.031)
experience
years of experience 0.013* (0.000)
SCIuniv 0.022* (0.001)
BIOMuniv 0.015* (0.001)
SSCIuniv 0.023* (0.001)
ARTSuniv 0.014* (0.001)
SCIcoll 0.014* (0.000)
BIOMcoll 0.006* (0.001)
SSCIcoll 0.009* (0.000)
ARTScoll 0.008* (0.002)
constant 9.952* (0.021)
Note: Number of observations: 37,434 workers
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
Interaction e¤ects between majors and region dummies are also included.38
Success probabilities
Figure A1: Predicted rst-year success probabilities
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Table A4: The probability of success
Period credits Coe¢ cient St. error
period 2 0 0.466* (0.028)
1 1.844* (0.034)
period 3 0 0.325* (0.051)
1 1.425* (0.038)
2 3.200* (0.062)
period 4 0 0.038 (0.111)
1 1.016* (0.056)
2 2.445* (0.056)
period 5 0 -1.435* (0.267)
1 -0.214* (0.092)
2 1.405* (0.064)
period 6 0 -1.351* (0.360)
1 -0.314* (0.139)
2 0.718* (0.103)
Note: Sample of 60% of 55,524 high school graduates, up to 6 periods
Base category = 0 credits in period 1
Table A4: The probability of success (continued)
SCI UNIV BIOM UNIV SSCI UNIV ARTS UNIV
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
constant type 1 -0.589* (0.232) -0.929* (0.257) -1.486* (0.166) -0.851* (0.194)
constant type 2 -3.092* (0.257) -3.472* (0.279) -3.928* (0.185) -3.870* (0.250)
male -0.254* (0.107) -0.213* (0.099) -0.488* (0.057) -0.415* (0.105)
general HSa
clas + math 1.750* (0.229) 2.474* (0.260) 3.658* (0.182) 3.670* (0.250)
clas + lang 1.053* (0.722) 0.923* (0.322) 2.496* (0.176) 2.197* (0.197)
sci + math 1.550* (0.214) 2.275* (0.247) 3.375* (0.181) 2.235* (0.270)
math + lang 0.606* (0.262) 1.130* (0.276) 1.929* (0.176) 1.577* (0.223)
econ + math 0.140 (0.305) 0.945* (0.330) 1.875* (0.170) 1.397* (0.374)
econ + lang -0.745* (0.660) -0.338 (0.443) 0.911* (0.165) 0.679* (0.199)
human -0.816* (0.746) -0.491 (0.578) 0.862* (0.175) 0.560* (0.210)
repeated -0.750* (0.200) -0.916* (0.172) -0.873* (0.081) -0.655* (0.145)
catholic HS 0.117 (0.116) 0.329* (0.126) 0.459* (0.072) 0.150 (0.130)
Note: Sample of 60% of 55,524 high school graduates, up to 6 periods
* statistical signicance at 5% level
a Base category = technical, artistic or professional high school
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Table A4: The probability of success (continued)
SCI COLL BIOM COLL SSCI COLL ARTS COLL
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
constant type 1 -1.114* (0.230) -0.387 (0.266) -1.084* (0.082) -0.300 (0.301)
constant type 2 -2.363* (0.244) -1.555* (0.285) -1.712* (0.085) -0.283 (0.321)
male -0.258* (0.072) -0.384* (0.090) -0.588* (0.031) -0.163* (0.103)
general HSb
clas + math 2.554* (0.260) 2.376* (0.342) 2.797* (0.139) 0.493 (0.382)
clas + lang 2.138* (0.380) 1.533* (0.338) 2.263* (0.113) 0.537 (0.331)
sci + math 2.685* (0.243) 2.624* (0.305) 2.429* (0.106) 0.381 (0.374)
math + lang 1.915* (0.253) 1.930* (0.305) 2.385* (0.105) 0.504 (0.336)
econ + math 1.903* (0.256) 1.618* (0.326) 2.308* (0.098) 0.754 (0.446)
econ + lang 1.345* (0.260) 0.896* (0.283) 1.881* (0.084) -0.304 (0.305)
human 1.181* (0.273) 0.699* (0.275) 1.810* (0.089) 0.227 (0.318)
technical HSb
management 0.770* (0.255) 0.065 (0.286) 1.213* (0.081) -0.584 (0.347)
sci + tech 1.433* (0.229) 0.670* (0.275) 1.324* (0.100) 0.519 (0.486)
social + tech 1.169* (0.296) 0.397 (0.270) 1.027* (0.091) -0.239 (0.443)
technics 1.346* (0.227) 0.700* (0.302) 0.916* (0.121) 0.037 (0.435)
other tech 1.012* (0.285) 0.378 (0.268) 1.051* (0.088) -0.670 (0.451)
artistic HSb 1.068* (0.258) 0.910 (0.578) 0.882* (0.147) 0.265 (0.295)
repeated -0.669* (0.058) -0.706* (0.087) -0.523* (0.032) -0.660* (0.117)
catholic HS 0.269* (0.066) 0.383* (0.102) 0.269* (0.036) 0.257* (0.115)
Note: Sample of 60% of 55,524 high school graduates, up to 6 periods
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
b Base category = vocational secondary education
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Dynamic discrete choice model
Table A5: Dynamic discrete choice model
Variables Coef. St. error
Utility parameters
travel costs (2) -0.298* (0.003)
credits (3) 1.955* (0.024)
earnings (5) 0.005* (0.000)
Switching costs
djt d
j
t 1
SCI BIOM -4.238* (0.096)
SSCI -4.253* (0.073)
ARTS -4.626* (0.139)
BIOM SCI -3.075* (0.086)
SSCI -3.750* (0.069)
ARTS -5.217* (0.213)
SSCI SCI -2.558* (0.050)
BIOM -3.371* (0.050)
ARTS -2.859* (0.054)
ARTS SCI -3.147* (0.127)
BIOM -4.434* (0.189)
SSCI -3.460* (0.077)
UNIV COLL -5.436* (0.072)
COLL UNIV -0.470* (0.034)
type 1 39.3%
type 2 60.7%
 0.95 (0)
Note: Sample of 60% of 55,524 high school graduates,
24 choice alternatives, up to 6 periods
* statistical signicance at 5% level
c Base category = same option in the previous period
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Table A5: Dynamic discrete choice model (continued)
SCI UNIVa BIOM UNIVa SSCI UNIVa ARTS UNIVa
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
constant type 1 -4.820* (0.104) -4.362* (0.111) -3.283* (0.072) -3.431* (0.085)
constant type 2 -9.854* (0.130) -9.175* (0.131) -6.872* (0.086) -7.774* (0.112)
male 1.064* (0.066) -0.435* (0.061) -0.051 (0.044) -0.017 (0.060)
general HSa
clas + math 7.519* (0.135) 7.365* (0.144) 5.594* (0.110) 5.674* (0.128)
clas + lang 4.185* (0.294) 5.921* (0.182) 5.676* (0.113) 6.269* (0.127)
sci + math 5.627* (0.150) 7.398* (0.131) 5.044* (0.098) 4.844* (0.131)
math + lang 1.939* (0.259) 5.680* (0.152) 4.893* (0.108) 4.803* (0.130)
econ + math 4.557* (0.166) 4.174* (0.175) 4.515* (0.106) 2.806* (0.179)
econ + lang 1.939* (0.257) 2.532* (0.199) 3.343* (0.086) 2.888* (0.108)
human 2.315* (0.305) 2.610* (0.241) 3.319* (0.095) 3.097* (0.118)
repeated -1.165* (0.098) -0.571* (0.093) -0.497* (0.054) -0.666* (0.078)
Note: Sample of 60% of 55,524 high school graduates, 24 choice alternatives, up to 6 periods
a Base category = drop-out option
b Base category = technical, artistic or vocational high school
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Table A5: Dynamic discrete choice model (continued)
SCI COLLa BIOM COLLa SSCI COLLa ARTS COLLa
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
constant type 1 -3.718* (0.101) -3.593* (0.121) -1.949* (0.047) -4.492* (0.135)
constant type 2 -5.750* (0.107) -6.060* (0.129) -2.912* (0.045) -6.411* (0.143)
male 0.724* (0.046) -0.864* (0.052) 0.000 (0.028) -0.229* (0.058)
general HSb
clas + math 3.347* (0.135) 3.989* (0.164) 0.425* (0.090) 3.810* (0.186)
clas + lang 2.306* (0.186) 4.009* (0.175) 1.070* (0.087) 0.186* (0.166)
sci + math 3.852* (0.116) 4.098* (0.145) 0.742* (0.071) 3.440* (0.180)
math + lang 3.514* (0.130) 4.083* (0.152) 1.162* (0.077) 4.161* (0.166)
econ + math 2.947* (0.132) 3.384* (0.163) 1.290* (0.076) 2.651* (0.202)
econ + lang 1.910* (0.124) 2.874* (0.141) 1.501* (0.057) 3.495* (0.149)
human 2.185* (0.134) 3.500* (0.142) 1.386* (0.061) 3.074* (0.157)
technical HSb
management 1.375* (0.118) 2.228* (0.141) 1.403* (0.049) 2.045* (0.164)
sci + tech 2.419* (0.109) 2.768* (0.140) 0.662* (0.064) 0.904* (0.217)
social + tech 1.791* (0.143) 3.636* (0.139) 1.687* (0.063) 2.020* (0.214)
technics 2.230* (0.104) 1.955* (0.148) -0.070* (0.068) 0.912* (0.203)
other tech 0.787* (0.132) 2.517* (0.132) 0.934* (0.053) 1.336* (0.204)
artistic HSb 2.061* (0.135) 0.498* (0.250) 0.239* (0.093) 3.507* (0.149)
repeated -0.353* (0.043) -0.416* (0.053) -0.184* (0.028) -0.092* (0.065)
Note: Sample of 60% of 55,524 high school graduates, 24 choice alternatives, up to 6 periods
a Base category = drop-out option
b Base category = vocational secondary education
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Policy counterfactuals
Figure A2: Admission standards limited to programs at university
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